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 Abstract 
Despite many decades of experimentation with supplier-led approaches to credit in many 
developing countries, limited success has been achieved in terms of improving access to 
credit for smallholder farmers. In the case of Mozambique, previous attempts by government 
to improve access to credit for farmers were not successful and the government is looking for 
more effective strategies. The purpose of this study is to examine experiences in other 
developing countries in Africa and Asia. The study is a multiple case studies selected from 
Zimbabwe, Thailand and Indonesia. 
  
The data collection method comprised a combination of primary collected through in-depth 
interviews with key informants and secondary sources. The data analysis techniques 
consisted of searching for themes regarding successful strategies in terms of dealing with 
costs and risks of lending to agriculture. 
 
Lessons from these cases were drawn to shed light on what the most effective intervention 
strategy for the Government of Mozambique could entail if it is to succeed to improve access 
to credit for smallholder farmers. The study concludes that an alternative strategy by the 
government to improve access to credit for smallholder farmers includes the re-establishment 
of a public rural bank. The study recommends that rural financial institutions should adopt a 
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Mozambique and other developing countries. 1.  INTRODUCTION 
Despite many decades of experimentation with supplier-led approaches to credit throughout 
the developing world, limited success has been achieved in improving access to credit and 
many developing countries are still searching for better ways to improve access to 
smallholder farmers.  
When demand exists and the environment is sufficiently competitive, banks can be expected 
to extend access to credit to include a variety of clients, including smallholder farmers and 
firms who are currently considered to be high-risk and too high-cost for financial viability of 
credit provision. However, the reality in the developing world is that there are many 
mismatches between potential demand and supply of financial services, which makes the 
exact source of market failures vague when they occur. In addition, as noted by Classens 
(2005), there is very limited evidence across countries on factors affecting access to financial 
services for small farm households and small firms. 
 
1.2 Brief overview of Rural Mozambique  
 
The agricultural sector has been the backbone of the economy of Mozambique for many 
decades. About 80% of the population rely on agriculture for their livelihood and, indeed, it 
represents about 95% of Mozambique’s primary sector (AfDB/OECD, 2006). Between 40% 
and 60% of export earnings in the country stem from this sector (AAAS/International/Africa, 
2000; The New Agriculturist, 2004). Despite agriculture being heavily dominated by food 
production for Mozambicans’ own consumption, the country not only imports more capital 
goods, fuel and energy, but also a huge amount of financial resources is expended on staple 
foodstuffs. 
Policy constraints, together with the chronic lack of access to improved varieties and crop 
management techniques, have been preventing smallholder farmers from accessing improved food crop technologies and markets. Therefore, the low level of output and marketable 
surplus leads to food insecurity, with adverse consequences for labour productivity (ECI, 
2003; MSU/MADER, 2004). With very limited access to external inputs, smallholder farmers 
remain with low levels of productivity. Extremely weak or non-existent financial services and 
lack of market facilities are key constraints to smallholder access to such inputs, and 
productivity enhancements cannot be achieved if the lack of investment in rural financial 
markets continues. 
 
1.3 Demand-driven paradigm for rural financial markets 
A shift in paradigm to a demand-driven approach in rural financial markets seems to be one 
way forward, if the aim to ameliorate the poverty of smallholder farmers and to promote rural 
economic development is to be realised in a developing country such as Mozambique.  As a 
result, a major challenge exists for Mozambique and other developing countries to identify 
sound rural finance institutions to serve smallholder farmers who, most often, have not been 
served by traditional formal banks and microfinance programmes. 
  Since many of the services required to promote smallholder farming and agricultural 
development are public goods (land, roads, water facilities, research and extension, etc.), one 
can expect little progress in achieving the objectives of agricultural development without 
government intervention. However, in the case of Mozambique, it is not clear whether the 
current proliferation of small donor-financed credit projects, including the special 
development funds (known as fundos do fomento), throughout the country, can be 
transformed into a more comprehensive credit market which is pro-poor, especially since the 
type of state coordination needed is not yet known. 
  1.4 Research Questions 
 In view of the poor performance of past and current government strategies implemented in 
Mozambique in this regard, and the existence of successful government efforts elsewhere, the 
following research questions arise:   
 
(1) What went wrong with the government strategies implemented in Mozambique 
between the mid-1970s and the mid-2000s in attempting to improve access to 
agricultural credit for smallholder farmers?  
(2) What are the positive experiences with government intervention strategies that have 
been implemented in other developing countries of Africa and Asia and that have 
succeeded in improving access to agricultural credit for smallholder farmers?  
(3) What can Mozambique learn from these countries with effective government 
intervention strategies that have succeeded in resolving or ameliorating the problem 
of the lack of access to agricultural credit for smallholder farmers?   
3. DATA SOURCES AND METHODS 
In this study, the  multiple case studies method was selected because of the need for an 
extensive examination of the context in which previous government strategies failed in the 
given situation. The case studies are also suitable for this study because of the need to explore 
alternative innovative approaches that were adopted by other developing countries to improve 
access to credit for smallholder farmers. The research efforts were organised around a study 
of the cases of Thailand, Indonesia, and Zimbabwe, in comparison with the Mozambican 
case. Data were collected from primary and secondary and sources. Data were collected from 
secondary and primary sources: Literature review, interviews, focus groups, informal 
interviews with key informants in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Attendance at a workshop 
on: Contracting Smallholder Farmers in Cash Crops Credit Schemes in Zimbabwe, and on field days. Qualitative methods of data collection included participatory observation during 
in-depth scheduled interviews with farmers. The data analysis techniques were used namely 
description of the main findings about successful government intervention strategies. Lessons 
from these cases were drawn and the analyses of the case studies were undertaken as an 
attempt to provide answers to the three research questions of the study. 
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
This chapter presents and discusses the results of the study. The first section considers the 
efforts by the government of Mozambique to improve access to credit for smallholder 
farmers. The second section discusses the main findings from the case studies. Thereafter, 
based on the findings of the study in Mozambique and other countries, the lessons were 
drawn from other developing countries in this regard. 
 
4.1 Efforts by the Government of Mozambique to improve access to agricultural credit  
Mozambican government efforts to develop a strategy to improve access to credit to 
smallholder farmers from the post-colonial era until the mead 2000s included: the 
establishment of the BPD, a development bank; privatisation of the BPD; establishment of 
parastatals and Government Development Funds. The BPD collapsed and the parastatals are 
currently performing poorly. The privatised commercial banks, including Austral, simply 
neglected the expansion of the bank’s portfolios for smallholder farmers. Agricultural 
development funds are experiencing managerial problems, face a scarcity of skilled field 
staff, and shortage of funds leading to their survival being brought into question. 
  
 4.1.1 The development bank: the People’s Development Bank approach  
Direct government intervention for improving access to credit for smallholder farmers in 
Mozambique included establishing in 1977 a development bank, the Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento (BPD), with the aim of creating an incentive for capturing savings, as well 
as of providing investment facilities to agriculture, industrial, housing and other sectors of the 
economy (Lubrimo, 2000). However, on average, the agricultural cooperatives received only 
5% to 10% of the total investment allocated by the BPD for the agricultural sector. In fact, 
the majority of the smallholder farmers, including the villagers, received almost nothing at all 
between 1977 and 1981 (Assane, 1999; Gaspar, 2000). Therefore, the smallest proportion of 
the financial resources was allocated to this sector. 
According to (Hanlon, 2004) in the 1980s, the BPD of Mozambique faced serious liquidity 
problems arising from:  
  mismanagement and improper loans; 
  inadequate credit assessment and monitoring procedures; 
  lack of loan recovery and collateral provided in many cases proved to be difficult to 
liquidate; 
  lack of appropriate technical expertise and technology; 
  shortage of qualified human resources 
As a result, the BPD increased interest rates, and made loans to newly opened sectors of the 
economy. However, by the 1990s, the bank was unable to settle the claims of local depositors 
and indeed, it was technically insolvent (Hanlon, 2004). Consequently, in 1991 World Bank 
suggests BPD be shut down (ISSN, 2002; ECI, 2003). 
Following Decree No. 21/95 of 16 May, the former BPD bank was proclaimed a commercial 
bank. However, the privatisation of the BPD has led to a concentration of its lending portfolio 
on less risky and bigger operations, and indeed, it failed to expand its lending services to 
smallholder farmers (Matola, 2001). As a result, in 1995, the BPD was liquidated.  The BPD 
was turned into a commercial bank, with mainly urban focus. 
 4.1.2 Lessons from the Banco Popular de Desenvolvimento of Mozambican  
Owing to problems of imperfect information in rural areas of Mozambique, mismanagement 
and moral hazard, the BPD’s day-to-day management operations also deteriorated. Many 
lessons can be drawn from the failures of the BPD to improve access to credit for smallholder 
farmers in Mozambique including that: 
•  Bad banking management, political interference and the civil war undermined BPD. 
•  Neglecting the provision of savings while emphasising lending at subsidised interest 
rates did not work. 
•  Lower interest rates were not translated into improving access to credit.  
Furthermore, the fact that the BPD also lacked a strategy to improve the business skills of the 
recipients of subsidised credit, lacked institutional capacity to enforce mechanisms for timely 
loan repayments, coupled with the fact that; the beneficiaries, lacked credit culture and 
discipline, led to high loan default rates. 
 
4.2. Cases studies   
This section has addressed the strategies by the governments from Asia and Africa with 
positive experiences in improving access to credit for smallholder farmers, respectively, the 
cases of Thailand and Indonesia and the case of Zimbabwe.     
4.2.1 The case a profitable agricultural government-owned bank in Thailand  
The Thai case study is a profitable agricultural government-owned bank which illustrates the 
reform policies undertaken at the Bank for Agriculture and the Agricultural Cooperatives 
(BAAC) of Thailand, which led to new methods of lending technology that suit smallholder 
farmers credit needs. 
 Several studies (Klein et al., 1999; Meyer & Nagarajan, 2001; Christen & Douglas, 2005) 
have found that Thailand is one of the few Asian countries with strong financial institutions 
that are capable of serving a large number of smallholder farmers. 
The strategies by the BAAC included the provision of many financial services such as;   
•  mobilised most of its resources through savings & lent to 86% of farm households in 
Thailand;  
•  use of joint liability methods 4 those without traditional collateral (75% of the 
borrowers; groups ranges from 5-30 members), including those who are engaged in 
non-farming activities; and  
•  loans to individuals with higher income and collateral. 
Therefore, the Thailand case has shown that, in spite of the shortcomings that have trapped 
agricultural development banks in many developing countries in the past three decades, 
lessons can be learnt from some government developing banks such as the BAAC. These 
lessons suggest that it may be feasible to reform agricultural development banks and also 
greatly improve their banking operations and outreach. This can only be accomplished if 
certain critical preconditions to facilitate their rehabilitation are in place. These include a 
favourable financial system environment, a real commitment to the profitability and 
sustainability of the rural bank operations, and an effective demand for rural financial 
services. 
 
4.2.2 The successful case of reforming a government-owned bank in Indonesia  
The Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) is one of a few notable examples of banks that have 
reformed successfully and achieved the goal of improving access to credit for smallholder 
farmers. It remains a unique profitable agricultural government-owned bank in Indonesia. 
The BRI of Thailand initially experienced problems similar to BPD but reacted quickly to change to survive. It implemented sound policies and a massive staff retraining programme, 
which turned its microfinancing unit to become a “tremendous” success (Seibel, 2000a). 
The case of the BRI has shown that if a bank is to succeed in implementing reforms, it 
requires setting up an appropriate legal and regulatory framework including setting prudential 
norms and effective internal controls and external supervision, and should entail operational 
autonomy and freedom from political interference in its daily basis operations (Seibel, 
2000a). Therefore, the results from Box 1 reveal that, in addition to interest rate deregulation 
and a management initiative to commercialise operations and supervision, innovative ways of 
lending to rural clients were also part of the core of the success of the BRI. 
 
4.2.3 Across the two Asian Case Studies 
Both the Asian cases from Thailand and Indonesia provides to Mozambique valuable lessons 
to succeed in improving access to credit for smallholder farmers through a government 
development bank including:  
  extensive system of branch banking was critical to reach and capture savings and 
loans;  
•  local savings mobilisation is a sustainable source of funds for lending and diversifying 
the loan portfolio; and 
•  the importance of investing in infrastructure (e.g. a computerised accounting system; 
communication systems, telephones; and roads).  
 
A summary of the key characteristics and indicators of success of the BAAC and the BRI is 
contained in Table 1. 
 4.4. The case study of Zimbabwe 
Section four presents the African experience with a relative success in improving access to 
credit for smallholder farmers through a government owned development bank. The case 
Zimbabwe records provides some positive lessons by demonstrating various strategic 
interventions for dealing with market failures in rural areas with the government playing an 
active key role.  
4.4.1 Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) 
Since independence in 1980, the Government of Zimbabwe has always played an active role 
in extending agricultural credit to smallholder farmers for crop and livestock production. In 
1980 and 1981, the government declared that loans would be granted to smallholder farmers 
in an attempt to redirect institutionalised agricultural credit. The smallholder farm credit 
scheme was thus established through two statutory financial instruments. This led to the 
establishment of the AFC which granted credit to smallholder farmers (Zumbika, 2000). 
Access to credit for smallholder farmers through AFC improved while long-term loans were 
granted to large-scale commercial farmers for infrastructural development projects (Rukuni, 
2006). 
 Zumbika (2000) explains that the exponential increase in demand for loans by smallholder 
farmers occurred in response to the shift in paradigm undertaken by the AFC. Furthermore, 
smallholder farmers became aware of the advantages of obtaining loans from the AFC that 
enabled them to adopt modern methods of farming. Farmers also began to realise that the use 
of modern technology made possible by access to credit from the AFC would enable them to 
increase their crop production and income. The increasing demand for loans from the AFC 
occurred in tandem with the government’s financial support for the smallholder farmers. 
  
The results from Table 2 show, that from 1982 to 1997, there was a noticeable and steady 
increase in the number of loans granted. Although it is evident from same Table that the 
number and value of loans have decreased since 1997, through the AFC lending approach, 
the government has, to some extent, succeeded in its efforts to improve access to credit for 
smallholder farmers. The figures in Table 2 illustrate this achievement. This may be 
attributed to the direct government intervention in the rural financial markets by establishing 
a financial institution and mobilising funds to be used for lending activities. 
The strategy by the Government of Zimbabwe to improve access to credit for smallholder 
farmers by promoting cash crops such as tobacco, led to the diversification from flue-cured 
tobacco, only grown by white commercial farmers, to other types of tobacco (air-cured and 
oriental) which mainly smallholder farmers began to grow. However, it is evident from Table 
3 that, the goal to improve access to credit for smallholder farmers was in fact achieved in the 
first decade but was not maintained in the second decade. Therefore, between 1988 and 1991, 
the AFC did not perform well and this can be explained by the value of the loans which 
began to decline slightly. Later on, between 1997 and 1999, the AFC did not perform well at 
all, which can be seen from the further sharp decline in the supply of funds. This indicates 
that, between 1988 and 1991, the AFC’s performance started to be threatened by the 
mismatching of the demand for loans by smallholder farmers and the supply of loans granted 
by this institution. The AFC realised that the smallholder farmer’s credit system would no 
longer be viable and sustainable, particularly because government no longer guaranteed the 
loans after 1985. Therefore, the AFC had to revisit its credit delivery system and the overall 
management of the smallholder agricultural lending portfolios. In addition, the undue 
interference by politicians had to be addressed. 4.4.2 Lessons from Zimbabwe: Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) 
•  farmer associations associated with a cash crop (tobacco): minimise the costs of 
production; 
•  requirement for farmers to contribute a proportion of total amount of a loan;  
•  loans to both small scale and large scale commercial agriculture;  
•  insurance required as one of the strategies to deal with the risks of lending to 
agriculture (govt. as guarantor); and  
•  credit can lead to increase technology adoption.  
4.4.3 The agricultural government bank strategy since 2000 
In 2000, the Government of Zimbabwe established an agricultural development bank, 
Agribank, as one of the major strategies to recapture the past gains of the government in its 
efforts to improve access to credit for smallholder farmers. The aim establishing the Agribank 
was to fill the vacuum that had been left by the AFC. The government created the 
Agricultural Development Assistant Fund (ADAF) under the umbrella of Agribank 
(Zumbika, 2000). 
The finding of this study shows that the Government of Zimbabwe faced similar challenges 
to those of the Government of Mozambique, including the shift from the policies designed 
during the colonial era that favoured white commercial farmers to new and inclusive policies 
towards developing the smallholder farming sector. However, in the case of Zimbabwe, after 
its independence, the government managed to design and implement policies that led to 
encourage smallholder farmers to adopt modern technology. These policies were meant to 
enable smallholder farmers to produce reasonable volumes of marketable food and cash 
crops. Strategies to achieve this goal included the launch by the Government of Zimbabwe of 
agricultural credit delivery schemes targeted at the smallholder farmers. In addition, the establishment of an agricultural development bank by the government also demonstrates that 
improving access to credit for smallholder farmers can be achieved if the government plays 
its role yet without interfering politically in the operations of the bank. Furthermore, proper 
lending conditions should be designed and implemented. In the case of the Agricultural 
Development Bank of Zimbabwe, the creation of an agricultural development assistant fund 
under its umbrella was a positive initiative. 
 
4.5. Requirements to be addressed by rural financial institutions 
Based on the Asian and African case studies, section five presents the requirements that need 
to be met by rural financial institutions in Mozambique in an attempting to improving access 
to credit for smallholder farmers. Strategies to increase borrowers’ willingness to repay 
should include: 
•  imposing penalties on late payment and making use of peer pressure; 
•  positive incentives, such as levying interest, to stimulate on-time payments; 
•  maintaining an efficient internal information system; 
•  professional management and considerable autonomy in their day-to-day operations; 
•  using bonus payments to promote high levels of staff efficiency; 
•  proper risk management measures and strategies must be developed and implemented; 
•  interest rates must be charged taking into consideration the market forces, but 
differentiated according to the categories of farmers; 
•  loans need to be profitably allocated to various income generating activities.  
5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The study conclude that since loans in all at the former Mozambican People’s Development 
Bank were provided only at subsidised interest rates, the bank (including the current rural 
finance institutions such as the development funds) had also overlooked the capacity of some of their clients to pay market related interest rates, while political interference led to 
politically well connected clients not being followed up when they failed to repay their loans. 
Therefore, these credit institutions and the BPD were also left with no alternative but to 
expand their sources of funds to non-agricultural projects. Therefore, smallholder farmers 
were persistently and continuously excluded by financial institutions such as commercial 
banks and semi-formal credit schemes operating in Mozambique. 
Experience from Thailand and Indonesia suggest that re-establishing a formal development 
bank can be effective if it presents a different face from that of the former BPD. However, the 
implication of this is that legislation for rural banks needs to be evaluated to ensure sounds 
legal environments for a public rural financial institution. In addition, financial sector policies 
need to be reviewed to determine whether they are appropriate for creating an environment 
conducive to financial innovations, particularly in the case of parastatal financial institutions 
and government developing funds. 
As demonstrated in Thailand, sufficient financial resources need to be mobilised and made 
available for the rural financial institutions to ensure that these are reasonably equipped to 
meet the credit needs of the smallholder farmers. Thus it may be necessary for the 
government to commit a certain portion of funds from its national budget to re-establish a 
government development bank while additional resources can be sourced from international 
development agencies and the donor community. 
  Another key lesson from Zimbabwe and Thailand is that investment in human capital 
development in Mozambique for the financial system is an essential investment alongside 
investment in infrastructure. Skilled human resources can not only ensure viable daily 
financial operations, but also look for innovations in rural services delivery systems, such as 
credit through cell phones and mobile ATMs. REFERENCES 
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Many lessons derived from the BRI’s experience: 
 Financial sector policies work successfully and create an environment conducive to financial 
innovations. 
 With attractive savings and credit products, appropriate staff incentives and an effective system of 
internal regulation and supervision, rural microfinance could be profitable. 
 The poor can save and rural institutions can mobilise their savings cost-effectively. 
 Without credit-biased incentives, the demand for savings deposit services exceeds the demand for 
credit by a wide margin. 
 Incentives for timely repayment are successful. 
 Transaction costs can be lowered and outreach to the poor can be increased by catering for both the 
poor and the non-poor with their widely differing loan size demands. 
 Outreach to a vast number of low-income people and financial self-sufficiency are compatible. 
 Agricultural development banks can be transformed into sustainable providers of microsavings and 
microcredit services. 
Source: Seibel (2000b) Table 1: Selected characteristics and performance indicators of the BAAC and the BRI 
Item BAAC  BRI 
Year established/reorganised  1966  1983/84 
Clientele Farmers,  cooperatives, 
farmers’ associations 
Rural low and middle-
income households 
Financial services  Loans and savings deposits  Loans and savings deposits 
Lending technology  Group and individual  Individual 
Approximate number of loans outstanding  3.1 million  2.3 million 
Volume of loans outstanding   US$ 1,285 billion  US$ 1.2 billion 
Average outstanding loan as a percentage 
of GDP per capita 
42 54 
Average annual volume of savings  US$ 2.8 billion  US$ 2.6 billion 
Average annual volume of savings as a 
percent of average annual outstanding 
loans 
66.5 199 
Number of savers  4.4 million  14.5 million 
Approximate nominal effective annual 
interest rate 
8.3 to 15.5  32.7 
Interest rate spread  1995:4.1  1994:21.7 
Total operating costs as percentage of 
Annual average outstanding loans 
1995:3.5 1994:13.5 
Return on assets  1995:0.55  1994:4.8 
Percentage of outstanding loans in arrears  8.3  6.5 
Subsidy dependence index  1995:35.4  1995: negative 
Source: Adapted from Meyer & Nagarajan (2001); Meyer (2002) Table 2: Loans granted by AFC to smallholder farmers in 1982-1999 
Year   Number of loans    Value of loans 
 
 
 Number  Percentage 
change 
Value ($Million)  Percentage 
change 
1982  34 710  -  15, 200  - 
1983 46019  33  19,200  26 
1984 92962  102  42,100  119 
1985 88463  (5)  51,400  22 
1986 93061  6  58,900  15 
1987 91094  (3)  78,200  33 
1988 82644  (9)  65,200  (17) 
1989 65841  (20)  52,500  (19) 
1990 49883  (24)  43,800  (17) 
1991 35609  (29)  34,700  (21) 
1992 34378  (3)  47,03  36 
1993 20979  (39)  56,350  20 
1994 17844  (15)  83,790  48 
1995 13190  (26)  114,855 37 
1996 12736  (3)  116,870 2 
1997 22077  73  215,414 84 
1997* 5869  (73)  121,305  (44) 
1998 353  (94)  30,696  (75) 
1999 496  40  35,000  14 
Source: Agricultural Finance Corporation (2000) 
 